This paper explores risk and retum relations in six Asian equity markets affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. After the start of the crisis, national equity betas increased and average retums fell substantially. Beta increases due to leverage linked to exchange rates. The increase in expected retum needed to accompany this rise in beta is made possible through the creation of capital losses that lower average retums. We propose a new probability-based asset pricing model that captures leverage effects using valuation ratios. Results show the role of leverage in explaining the likelihood of the financial crises. Crosssectional evidence supports time-series findings.
I. Introduction
The Asian crisis materialized with the devaluation of the Thai baht July 2, 1997 and spread quickly to other Asian equity markets. The severity of the crisis provides a unique opportunity to understand financial crises and their manifestations. It has caused international investors and academics to reassess the benefits of investing in emerging markets. Based on a sample of six Asian countries (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand) from October 1990 to June 1998, currencies collectively lost almost half their value and their U.S. dollar denominated equity market retums dropped sevenfold after the crisis began.' This paper investigates the role of leverage in explaining risk and retum changes in affected Asian markets before and after the financial crisis.
Leverage is a key feature of current financial crises models. Krugman (1999) states that high leverage financed through extensive foreign currency borrowing starting after 1990 made Asian economies particularly susceptible to financial crisis. Bris and Koskinen (2002) show that depreciation is a solution to a debt overhang problem. Gande, John, and Senbet (2002) view financial crises as usually involving a corporate debt problem. Harvey and Roper (1999) assert that firms accumulated "excess" leverage in what they call the Asian "bet." Leading up to the crisis, Asian firms bet on future growth by committing increasing amounts of short-term U.S. dollar denominated debt to their already heavily levered capital structures.^ Once devaluation ensued, leverage, linked to exchange rates, substantially increased and interest payments became harder to meet. This effect was universally experienced in these countries, which lacked significant industrial diversification. Consistent with the deteriorating balance sheets of Asian firms, Baig and Goldfajn (1998) report that sovereign debt yields skyrocketed.
Researchers have also addressed the moral hazard problems associated with financial liberalization and maintaining fixed exchange rates that effectively reduce the relative cost of debt financing. Mishkin (1999) argues that asymmetric information problems started with financial liberalization. Lenders and supervisory agencies are ill equipped to handle rapidly growing credit and lack both the resources and expertise to effectively monitor contracts. Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) discuss moral hazard issues related to maintaining fixed exchange rates. Central Banks implicitly give guarantees to creditors by providing hedging services and "over borrowing" results.
We observe that the average national equity market beta increases fivefold after the start of the crisis. Devaluations are infrequent events and by themselves are not expected to change risk premia, but in the presence of unhedged debt, devaluation directly affects firms' capital structures and therefore discount rates. The rise in discount rates and the necessary creation of capital losses after the start of the crisis resolve an apparent asset pricing irregularity where post-crisis betas rise and average retums fall. Average retums are negatively correlated with changes in beta because they contain capital gains and losses.
The date that defines the start of the crisis must be carefully considered to model the changes in risk and retum. The Thai bhat devaluation of July 2, 1997 is the "official" date of the crisis;^ however, investors' risk assessments do not change ovemight. Evidence gleaned from news services indicates investors started revising their expectations earlier than that date and continued to update them in the post-crisis period. Tests show significant discrete shifts in risk and return after the official start of the crisis, and structural change tests confirm significant changes in risk and retum without imposing economic priors. Consistent with economic news, statistical break point estimates identify a crisis date five or more months after the official date; at the depth of the crisis.
Our empirical asset pricing models seek to capture the evolution of discount rate changes with portfolios managed by valuation ratios." * Fama and French (1993) suggest the price-to-book (P/B) ratio could proxy for an omitted distressed Harvey and Roper (1999) report annual book leverage ratios for emerging markets from 1992 to 1996. The average deht-to-equity ratios for Asian countdes increased dramatically. For 1992 and 1996 , the average total debt-to-equity ratios are: Indonesia (137% and 202%), South Korea (123% and 257%), Malaysia (188% and 336%), the Philippines (55% and 105%), Taiwan (27% and 201%) , and Thailand (261% and 417%). In the early stages of financial liberalization, long-term financing arrangements are not available and intemational lenders are unwilling to lend in the local currency.
'See Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) . ""We use managed portfolios to characterize time variation in beta. See Cochrane (2001) .
firm risk factor. ^ Ferguson and Shockley (2003) illustrate that firm leverage is directly related to valuation ratios. In a discounted cash flow model. Berk (1995) finds lower P/B ratios reflect higher discount rates. We find valuation ratios are half their pre-crisis levels.
The first asset pricing model examined in this paper, commonly seen in the literature, characterizes the time variation in beta as a linear function of valuation ratios and world market conditions.* This model is compared to a benchmark asset pricing model with a stmctural break at the start of the crisis and has success in describing shifts in beta but not average retums. Second, we propose a new probability-based asset pricing model to describe changes in average retums. This model uses, in addition to the world market portfolio, a portfolio that is the world market retum managed by an index of investor sentiment. The index of investor sentiment is based on the likelihood of the crisis modeled as a logistic function of leverage indicators and world market conditions. This approach allows the explicit incorporation of investors' assessment of the likelihood of a financial crisis into evolution of beta and discount rates. We estimate the resulting logit and normal regression moment conditions simultaneously and bootstrap critical values of tests' statistics.
Our probability-based asset pricing model can account for the substantial increase in beta and lower average retums after the crisis began. Moreover, this model predicts a rise in risk premia well before the crisis; the other model does not. This suggests that investors started to revise their expectations before the crisis officially started. This prediction is supported by news of currency speculation and the troubles with the Thai economy prior to the crisis. Results show the role of leverage in explaining the likelihood of financial crises. Further, firm-level evidence from the six countries also shows that changes in leverage are associated with cross-sectional differences in average retums.
In Section II, we outline the asset pricing models and testing methodology. Section III shows descriptive statistics of the six sample countries. Section IV presents results from the benchmark model, provides statistical break point tests, reports estimates of break dates, and reconciles break point tests with economic news. Section V describes the leverage indicators, the moment conditions examined, estimation results, and presents cross-sectional evidence. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Models of Expected Returns
We implement an asset pricing model that uses portfolios managed by valuation ratios to incorporate the impact of changes in leverage and business risk on average retums. Expected retums are mimicked by portfolios that are a combination of the world market portfolio managed by information about valuation ratios. The introduction of managed portfolios effectively allows the beta of each country to time vary according to a chosen information set. Consider an intemational asset pricing model (IAPM) where time variation in beta and conditional 'Fama and French (1998) also find that the hook-to-market effect is present in an intemational setting.
*For example, Lewellen (1999) adopts this approach to examine U.S. data. expected retums are characterized by a set of managed portfolios that mimic expected retums,
where r, is a vector of time t excess dollar retums for n countries and is a linear combination of retums on k managed portfolios that are the product of the excess world market retum r^, and k information variables, Z,_i (i.e., valuation ratios) with 7 as the vector of coefficients.^ In this approach, portfolios are managed in the sense that information is used to assign weights to the world market portfolio creating new portfolios that have their own distinct payoffs. The traditional intemational capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) is obtained if a constant is the only instrument used to weight the world market portfolio. Equation (1) can be expressed in terms of the portfolio weights given to each country, where 0J^\Z,-\ = 7Z,_i, is a vector of time-varying betas that are linear in the instmments. We posit expected retums in this manner to allow for the instmment set to directly affect beta through the covariance between the world market retum and each country's retum. We call this model TV-IAPM.
In this paper, we propose an altemative model of expected retums that depends on a portfolio managed by investors' assessment of the likelihood of a financial crisis. Instead of betas depending directly on the instmments set, they depend on the conditional probability of the financial crisis given leverage indicators and world market conditions. The conditional probability reveals a latent index of investor sentiment. We write expected retums for n countries as a combination of the world market and the world market portfolio managed by an index of investor sentiment as
where /3f |Z,_i = Ao + Aip(/,|Z,_i), is a vector of time-varying betas depending on n-dimensional vectors of fixed coefficients Ao and A|. Investors' assessment of the likelihood of the financial crisis given the available information is p{I,\Z,-\), The index of investors' sentiment is based on the logistic relation,
wherep(/,|Z,_ i) is the conditional probability of the financial crisis /, given known information Z,_ i with 9 as coefficients. /, is a binary variable that is zero before the crisis period and one after the crisis begins. We call this formulation of expected retums the P-IAPM. A benchmark model with a structural break at the start of the crisis period is used to assess the magnitude of the shifts in beta and average retums. The expected retums pre-and post-crisis are (5) £(r,|/, = 0) = (3E{r^,) and E{r,\I,= model is a variant of the standard conditional international asset pricing models utilized hy Dumas and Solnik (1995) , Bekaert and Harvey (1995) , Ferson and Harvey (1998) , and Ghysels (1998), among others.
where the vector of coefficients cj) depicts the shift in betas after the crisis begins.
After establishing the significance of the benchmark model, we test whether our managed portfolio formulations can account for the shifts in beta. We cast each model in terms of the benchmark, -iE (r^,) and where q = (TV,P) for TV-IAPM and P-IAPM specifications. If (t)" is statistically zero, then the particular formulation of expected retums q can offer an explanation for the shifts in risk and retum when the crisis started.
III. Data
The six Asian countries that abandon their exchange rate management policy at the height of the financial crisis in the summer of 1997 are Indonesia (ID), South Korea (KR), Malaysia (MY), the Philippines (PH), Taiwan (TW), and Thailand (TH). We obtain weekly data on national equity market total retums, exchange rates, P/B and price-to-eamings (P/E) ratios of each country, together with 48 emerging market country averages of these variables from Standard & Poor's Emerging Markets Database (EMDB). Our sample spans 401 weekly (end of Friday) observations from October 5, 1990 to June 5, 1998. ^ The world retum (WD) is represented by the Morgan Stanley Capital Market Intemational (MSCI) world index. U.S. dollar retums for the national markets are computed by translating the local index retum into U.S. dollars using the end of week exchange rate. Excess returns are obtained by subtracting the three-month U.S. Treasury bill yield. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample countries. The crisis culminates with the abandonment of exchange rate supports and a drastic depreciation of Asian currencies. Panel A reports devaluation dates and total depreciation of exchange rates before and after the start of the crisis. After Thailand, a wave of devaluations follows and currencies collectively lose almost half their value. A rank correlation between the timing of devaluation and its extent indicates that there is weak evidence (i.e., p = 0.22) that countries which wait to devalue suffer the worst devaluation.
The retums to intemational investors not only suffer from currency devaluation, but also from dismptions in local markets. Panels B and C of Table 1 provide a decomposition of annualized dollar retums before and after devaluations. The equity retums of all six Asian countries drop after the crisis and standard deviations increase substantially while these effects are more pronounced in dollar terms. The six-country average U.S. dollar retum decreases by more than sevenfold and standard deviations increase more than threefold when comparing before and after devaluation samples. The effect of the crisis is slowly realized. Even in the last subperiod after devaluations (Sub2) retums are still negative. Harvey (1995) claims that EMDB backfilling problems and the associated survivorship bias is confined to the pre-1981 sample period. The dividend price ratio is excluded from this study due to missing observations for Indonesia.
Before devaluation, the local market retum almost exclusively determines the U.S. dollar retum because of currency management policies. After devaluation, exchange rates are responsible for more than half of the drop in dollar retums (six-country average in Table 1 , panel B). The increase in the volatility of dollar retums is due to increases in both local market volatility and exchange rates. The standard deviation of dollar retums before devaluations is determined by local retums; after devaluations, half of the volatility of dollar retums is related to exchange rates (six-country average in panel C). Taiwan is an exception with its standard deviations changing very little. The local retum and the exchange rate movements reinforce one another, further amplifying their effect on dollar retum volatility. Referring to panel C, the correlation between local retums and exchange rates pR,s ehange from virtually zero in the pre-devaluation period to more than 40% in all countries and as much as 58% in South Korea in the postdevaluation period. Panel A reports devaluation dates of Indonesia (iD), South Korea (KR), Malaysia (MY), Philippines (PH), Taiwan (TW), Thaiiand (TH), totai currency cfianges for pre-crisis, post-crisis, and the whole sample period that spans October 5, 1990 to June 5, 1998 (401 weeks). Panel B reports annualized means and standard deviations of U.S. doiiar returns {Rus), local market returns (R), and exchange rates (S). Locai EMDB index returns (end of week) are converted to U.S. doilars using the end of week exchange rate. The before and after devaluation periods are based on the closest Friday after each event date reported in panel A and subperiods (Sub1 and Sub2) spiit in haif before and after devaluation periods. The variance decomposition in panei C uses tfie approximation that ignores the cross-term between the local return and the exchange rate and reports annualized standard deviations of U.S. doiiar returns a{Rus), locai market returns cr(/?), exchange rates rr(S), and the correiation of exchange rates with local market returns pn j. Panel D reports annualized means and standard deviations of the MSCi worid index in excess of the three-month T-Biil rate, the average correlation between countries p(Rj, Rf), and the average of correlations with the world index p(R,, fljv). The subperiod for the world index is based on Juiy 2,1997.
This positive correlation between exchange rates and local retums is consistent with leverage linked to exchange rates. Devaluation in export-oriented countries normally enhances investment opportunities, leading to an increase in firm value resulting in a negative correlation of exchange rates and local retum. As Kmgman (1999) points out, Asian firms that were characterized by heavy leverage financed through extensive foreign currency borrowing could not take advantage of these growth opportunities because their balance sheets eroded after devalua-tion destroying entrepreneur wealth used as collateral for lending. Depreciation works against firm value if firms are heavily levered in foreign currency, resulting in the positive correlation seen in these data. Accounting for risk can generate the same effect that Krugman predicts. Leverage increases with exchange rate depreciation cause equity betas to rise. Investors suffer capital losses because the equities they hold become more risky. Local retums have positive correlation with exchange rate changes because they are associated with capital gains and losses in the local market.
Panel D of Table 1 reports annualized means and standard deviations of U.S. dollar retums in excess of the three-month T-bill for the average of the six countries and the MSCI world index. The average world retum and its standard deviation change very little over the sample period. As found in the literature, these countries display very high volatility relative to the world market retum.' Panel D also depicts the average correlation between countries and the correlations between local retums and the world retums pre-and post-devaluations. The correlations increase after the start of the crisis because countries devalue around the same time.'° More striking is that average correlation with the world retum more than doubles after devaluations. In sum, investing in the markets became more risky while yielding lower average retums and fewer diversification opportunities. The next section documents the magnitude and significance of shifts in risk and retum around the start of the crisis.
IV. Tests for Changing Exposure to Systematic Risk

A. Shifts in Beta at Devaluation and Crisis Dates
The Thai bhat devaluation on July 2, 1997 is the earliest economic date used in the literature as the start of the Asian crisis. An ICAPM with a discrete structural break at the start of the crisis is a potential candidate benchmark model for evaluating our specifications of beta. From equations (5), the candidate multicountry benchmark model is
with moment conditions,
where rj, and r^w, are the excess returns of each country and the world indices, /TH is the indicator variable for the start of the crisis in Thailand, and e, is the residual vector for the six countries. The coefficients (poj and (j)\j assess changes in intercept and slope. Table 2 contains our regression findings. For comparison purposes, we present stmctural break results for each country at its devaluation date and at the date the crisis started. Referring to the coefficient averages in panel A, beta jumped 'See De Sands and Imrohoroglu (1997) , Bekaert and Harvey (1997) , and Aggarwal, Inclan, and Leal (1999) .
'"Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2004) find evidence of contagion effects during the Asian crisis fivefold from before to after the crisis began. The intercept terms are negative and significant after devaluation. Consistent with any equilibrium asset pricing model, as beta increases, investors suffer capital losses lowering average retums. The results are virtually the same whether the devaluation date or the crisis date is used as the indicator. Five of six countries have significant breaks at the 10% level except Taiwan. Table 2 presents benchmark ICAPM regression coefficients and joint tests for six Asian countries. The set of coefficients in panei A presents structural break results in the iCAPM reiation first using the devaiuation date of each country and then the benchmark crisis date, July 2, 1997, for aii countries in the rightmost coiumns. The coefficients a and /3 is the intercept and beta of the ICAPM and 0o and 0i represent the shifts in intercept and siope. Ail returns are in U.S. doiiars in excess of the U.S. three-month T-bili rate. Local EMDB index returns (end of week) are converted to U.S. doiiars using the EMDB end of week exchange rate. The market return is the MSCI world index return. These data span October 5, 1990 to June 5, 1998 (7 = 401). p-values are in parentheses. Panei B presents the p-vaiues from Waid, J-stat, and LR tests joint hypotheses described in the panei that inciude aii countries and df denotes the degrees of freedom. For pane! B. the benchmark system (equations (7)) is estimated with GMM and a first-order Newey and West correction appiied.
Our investigation into whether expected return formulations capture the structural breaks and whether the resulting model conforms to asset pricing restrictions leads us to examine additional related hypotheses defined in panel B of Table 2 . Joint tests of the benchmark model use Wald, 7-statistics, and Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistics on a system estimated by Hansen's (1982) GMM with a Newey and West (1987) correction for heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation. '' Panel B shows evidence of a discrete shift in beta across countries. The Wald and LR tests show similar results. They strongly reject the joint hypothesis involving no discrete shifts in beta across countries. They also confirm that the intercept changes after the crisis. The J-statistic tests fail to reject all of the hy-'' We selected lag lengths of one to 10 to check robustness. Our conclusions are the same.
potheses. Ghysels (1998) and Garcia and Ghysels (1998) discuss the notoriously low power of J-statistics in detecting stmctural change.
B. Evaluating Statistical Breaks and Break Date Estimates
Evidence for large significant shifts in risk and retum in Asian countries using either their devaluation dates or the official crisis date is convincing. However, investors may have anticipated changes in risk long before the first devaluation. We first look at changes in the ICAPM relation without imposing a particular break date for each country to evaluate whether the Thai devaluation is a contributing rather than an initiating factor in reassessing asset prices. We identify statistical break dates, form confidence intervals for the break dates, and assess if the earliest date given by the confidence interval is before the official start of the Asian crisis.
We use a battery of tests on the traditional ICAPM (equation (7a) without the break) for each country separately to identify structural breaks without imposing economic priors. We employ the standard CUSUM, the CUSUMSQ, the Chow test, and the Andrews (1993) LM-test. The Andrews test has the most attractive power properties of the four. ' •Û nder the Andrews (1993) sup-LM test for a stmctural break with an unknown break point, a particular interval is inspected for a possible break. The
SUP^^IJLMT{TI)
test statistic is the maximum value of successive tests that occurs at 7r (proportion of sample) in the sampling interval defined by 77. Supremum (sup) tests are based on a distribution of the maximum value from successive test statistics where critical values depend on the window size and the numbers of break coefficients. The Andrews sup-test is analogous to recording the maximum value from successive F-tests, which places a dummy variable depicting a pre-and post-test date for each date inside a designated test window. We employ the most general of Andrews' tests, the sup-LM test, which allows for variances to change in successive pre-and post-dates and Newey West corrections of covariance matrices (Eq. 4.3 in Andrews (1993) ). This methodology permits the examination of breaks in intercept and/or slope as well as inspecting a system for full or partial breaks.
Collectively, these tests confirm the presence of a stmctural break in the ICAPM relation. Panel A in Table 3 presents the results of our structural break tests. The CUSUMSQ and Chow tests find strong evidence for stmctural change with the exception of Taiwan confirming regression results. '^ The CUSUM tests, which have the weakest power of the three, do not reject. ' "^ Sup-LM tests confirm the presence of a full or partial stmctural change for each country without imposing a change date. We computed successive LM statistics over the entire sample and observed that global maximum values occur between four and one-half to seven months after the Thai devaluation date. As long as the testing interval includes these globally maximum dates, the results are the same. We report test '^Ghysels (1998) and Garcia and Ghysels (1998) use the Andrews LM-test to detect stmctural change in retums data.
"We examined CUSUMSQ plots to gain an understanding of when the ICAPM relation becomes unstable, but they do not reveal a clear pattern. The Chow tests split the sample in half.
'" •Garbade (1977) reports the weak power properties of CUSUM tests.
results using the last half of our sample for the testing interval, which encompasses all the devaluation dates. Panel A shows p-vaiues from CUSUM, CUSUMSO, and CHOW tests and reports sup LM(7r) statistics using Andrews' (1993) equation 4.3 using critioal vaiues from Tabie 1 (p. 840). The observation window is 201 (7ri = 0.5) to 389 (71-2 = 0.97), X = 32.33. The number of break points p = 2 for fuii structurai change {a, 13} and p = 1 under partiai change, a oniy or /3 only. For the system tests, p = 12 under fuii structural change and p = 6 for a oniy or 0 only. Panei B provides confidence intervais on break dates based on Bai (1997) equations (17) and (18) and distributions presented in his Appendix B. The break date estimate i< is the observation that corresponds to sup LM(7r) for each country. Skewed confidence intervais aiiow tor different covariance matrices pre-and post-break estimate. Panel C presents the number of unique news reports of bond downgrades from September 1996-February 1998. ***,**,* denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance leveis, respectively. Bai (1997) shows the dates that correspond to the Andrews test statistic are the least squares estimates of the break dates. The estimate of the break date is k = arg mini<;t<7-'S'r(^), where Sjik) is the sum of squared residuals, k = [KT], -K e (0,1), and [•] denotes the greatest integer function. The break date estimate maximizes the difference between sets of coefficients from the two subsamples defined by the break date thereby minimizing the sum of squares. This objective is equivalent to choosing the date that maximizes the Andrews sup-LM statistic.
Panel B in Table 3 presents break date estimates. The break date estimate k is the observation that corresponds to SUP,^^JJLMT{TT) for each country. The skewed confidence interval allows for different covariance matrices for pre-and post-^. The statistical break dates fall well after the devaluation event dates. We cannot reject that the statistical break points and devaluation dates are the same for Korea and Taiwan, the last to devalue. In other countries, devaluation dates fall before the start of each country's confidence interval. Only the interval of Taiwan encompasses the start of the crisis. Taiwan is the country with the weakest evidence of a stmctural shift and therefore has the widest of all the confidence intervals. This evidence indicates that the crisis came as a surprise to investors and that the Thai devaluation is the start of significant risk and retum changes in Asian countries.
C. Reconciling Economic and Statistical Event Dates
Statistical tests may lead one to conclude the first devaluation is an initiating factor to the reassessment of risk in the region. The problem is that statistical event dates do not pin down the start of the crisis; rather they indicate when the crisis is at its worst. Break point estimates look for the maximum difference in the coefficient vector from two subsamples. As such, the maximum difference is at the height of the crisis not the start. We reconcile economic and statistical break dates and gain a sense of how investor expectations change over this tremulous period by presenting a summary of news reports of currency speculation in the Thai baht, and announcements by the World Bank and IMF. We also examine the timing of Standard & Poor's and Moody's downgrading of debt instruments of particular countries. 'Ŵ ire services reported speculation in the Thai bhat as early as February 1997, suggesting investors started to reassess risk and retum before the official start of the crisis July 2, 1997. A general slowing of economic growth since 1996 and mounting bad loans to property developers made the baht continue to weaken. When devaluation was announced, it came as a surprise to some analysts as it was thought that the Bank of Thailand had been successful in keeping speculators at bay. In spite of the wave of devaluations that followed Thailand's, it took time for investors to realize the extent and duration of the crisis. Consistent with the break point estimates we find, IMF analysts did not revise their economic outlook until December of that year.
Debt rating agencies downgraded Thai debt instmments one month after the start of the crisis. Panel C in Table 3 presents the number of reported debt instrument downgrades by Moody's and Standard & Poor's. Before the Thai devaluation, there were two reports, both for Thailand. A flood of downgrades followed in December when the debts of Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand sunk to junk bond status. Many of these downgrades came two days after the issuance of the December 20, 1997 revised IMF outlook. We did not find any reports for Taiwan, which is consistent with our earlier findings.
Taiwan was arguably the country least affected by the Asian crisis. The Central bank announced a change in exchange rate policy, but certainly had sufficient foreign currency reserves to thwart speculators. In 1997, Taiwan had the third largest stock of foreign currency reserves in the world after Japan and China. 'T aiwan also had at least two and one-half times the foreign currency reserves Leverage is difficult to measure and the data is likely to consist of annual book values. However, observable valuation ratios containing price, which are part of market leverage, respond to changes in leverage as well as business risk because price changes convey information about discount factor change. This link can be understood through a standard discounted cash flow model. " Today's earnings or book values predict next period's cash fiows and price is the discounted value. ^^ The increase in equity beta caused by leverage or business risk raises expected retum; price reflects the change in discount rate and lowers the valuation ratio, as capital losses must be suffered to make higher expected retums possible.^'
We use indicators of leverage and other controls for world market conditions to embed information into the evolution of beta. The indicators of leverage are the P/B and P/E ratios and exchange rates (FX), lagged one week. Exchange rates are included as a leverage proxy because interest payments are denominated in U.S. dollars. Table 4 presents summary statistics on the instruments. P/B and P/E ratios are closely related, being scaled versions of price. Panel A shows both P/B and P/E ratios fell to nearly half their pre-crisis averages in the post-cdsis sample indicating higher discount rates and leverage after the start of the crisis. Taiwan is again the exception with its ratios remaining constant. On average, the annualized return on holding foreign exchange is -51.7% for the post-crisis period. It was virtually zero before the crisis. U.S. dollar excess retums are negatively correlated with their indicators on average and this correlation strengthens after the crisis. A negative relation would be predicted with lower P/B and P/E ratios: the lower the P/B, P/E, or retums to foreign exchange in a particular week, the higher the expected retums in the following week.
Panel B reports summary statistics for broader emerging market conditions in 48 emerging markets as well as an average correlation between local retums and these instruments. The lagged world retum, R-WD, is also included as part '^International Financial Statistics and database from Central Bank of China foreign exchange reserves. ' '^Agence France Presse, October 19, 1997. "The argument is detailed in a simple model available from the authors. " Pontiff and Schall (1998) provide evidence that P/B ratios and book values on DJIA and S&P industrials predict future market retums and earnings, respectively.
'A fall in growth rates is unlikely to explain a decline in valuation ratios. If expected retums increase, then the capital losses incurred make possible the higher expected retums. Some combination of higher growth rates and future capital gains must occur in order to finance higher expected retums. Also, in export-oriented economies devaluation is thought to enhance growth opportunities. Tabie 4 presents the annuaiized means, standard deviations, and own country correiation of each indicator with the U.S. doiiar excess return. Sampie for each country consists of 401 observations and covers the period from 10/05/90 to 06/05/98. Tile iocai leverage indicators (zL ,) in panel A are the locai P/B and P/E ratios and foreign exchange returns (FX). The giobai mari(et conditions (zf_ ^) in panei B are the emerging mari<et price-to-book ratio (P/B-EM), the emerging mari<et price-to-earnings ratio (P/E-EM), the MSCI world index returh (R-WD), and the emerging country index returns (R-EM). The before-and after-crisis periods are based on the ciosest Friday after the Thai event date Juiy 2, 1997.
of the broader market conditions. The valuation ratios for the broader markets change very little over the sample period. As with local P/B and P/E ratios, the correlation of local market dollar retums and broader emerging market ratios are negative and strengthen after the start of the crisis. It is interesting to note that the P/B and P/E ratios of the Asian countries in our sample are much higher before the crisis and come back into line with broader emerging market values after the crisis. Taiwan has ratios similar to the broader markets.
B. Portfolios Managed by Leverage: TV-IAPM
The first attempt to describe the changes in risk and retum after the start of the crisis uses portfolios managed by leverage and world market conditions to yield time-varying betas that are linear in a set of instruments. The empirical setup from equation (6) (l,I^li,,rw,,ITHtrwt,Zj,_^rw,,ZJ|_^rw,] ej,\ = 0, 7 = (1,6),
where the 7th country's excess retum rj, is written in terms of the benchmark model and regressed on a constant aj, an indicator variable for Thailand /TH with (f>oj as its shift parameter, and the excess retums on the world portfolio r^. The time-varying coefficients of the world market portfolio are comprised of a break parameter 4>ij for the indicator variable and a time-varying beta /S/Jz'f, that depends on local leverage indicators Zj,_^ and global market conditions Zf_^. Beta is linear in these instruments where 70, is a constant, 7/, is a vector of coefficients for local leverage indicators consisting of P/Bj, P/Ej, and FXy, and 7^^ is a vector of coefficients on global market conditions consisting of P/B-EM, P/E-EM, R-WD, and R-EM.^P anel A of Table 5 presents country-by-country results of the TV-IAPM with stmctural breaks. Columns 1-3 show shifts in beta become less significant for many countries. Four countries, rather than one country in the benchmark case, do not exhibit a discrete shift in beta after the crisis at the 10% level. Columns 4-6 show leverage indicators and global market conditions are insignificant in predicting retums four countries. Columns 7-8 test for a stmctural break in each country, whether TV-IAPM holds and there is no structural break in each country. The introduction of information into beta did not weaken the evidence for stmctural shifts that is virtually the same as found with benchmark model tests.
Panel B reports tests of joint hypotheses with betas dependent on local indicators, global conditions, and both information sets. The column labeled None corresponds with benchmark results reported in panel A of Table 2 . Significant shifts in betas remain across countries after introducing information into the dynamics of these betas. Benchmark results remain unchanged, regardless of the information set employed. Panel B also reports joint tests of information sets independently. Entries in this section of the table correspond to the fact that information sets can only be tested when they are also used in estimation. Tests indicate both information sets are potentially important to predicting retum variation among these Asian countries. ^Ô verall, results indicate that significant shifts in betas remain across countries after introducing portfolios managed by leverage and world market conditions; however, the shifts in beta become less significant in many countries. Leverage indicators and global market conditions are important in predicting retums for are three local instruments and four global instruments in each country's equation. This raises the number of coefficients in the system from 24 in the base case to 24 -H 18 = 42 where only local instruments are used, 24 -H 24 = 48 where only global instruments are used, and 24 -H 18 -H 24 = 66 where local and global instruments are used.^ LR-tests lead to the same conclusion and are not reported. Tabie 5 presents resuits from estimating an asset pricing model (equations (8)) where beta is made time-varying with portfolios managed by locai leverage indicators and giobai mari<et conditions (TV-iAPM). This modei is constructed to aliow for a structurai break at the time of the crisis in Thaiiand. Refer to Tabie 1 and Tabie 3 for descriptions of variabies. Sampie covers 10/05/90 to 06/05/98. Coiumns 1-3 in panei A sfiow the constant term, aj, and the coefficients 0o/, and 0iy that aiiow for a structurai breai< in the TV-iAPM at the time of crisis. Coiumns 4-6 provide p-vaiues from Waid tests that examine the importance of iocai ieverage indicators 7/ = 0, giobai mari<et conditions ig = 0, and both 7, = 73 = 0 in predicting each country's returns. Cciumns 7 and 8 present p-vaiues from Waid tests of no structurai break and test of whether TV-iAPM hoids where the intercept equais zero and there is no structurai break. Panei B reports the p-vaiues with Waid tests of hypotheses H-^-Hg (described in Tabie 2, panel B) invoiving aii countries with betas depending on iocai indicators L, giobai conditions G, and both information sets L+G, The coiumn labeied None corresponds with benchmark results (Tabie 2, panei B) and df denotes degrees of freedom. The last set of tests refers to the importance of iocai ieverage indicators, giobai market conditions, and both to predicting returns in the system of equations.
the system as a whole. The introduction of information into beta does not weaken the evidence for stmctural shifts that is largely due to its failure to capture the change in average retums.
C. Portfolios Managed by Probability Assessments: P-IAPM
The second formulation for including information about leverage into the evolution of beta is based on a portfolio managed by an index of investor sentiment. It is a latent variable that gives an assessment of the likelihood of the financial crisis conditioned on leverage indicators and world market conditions. In this formulation, beta is given as a linear projection on the investors' sentiment index. The empirical analog for equations (6) The associated moment conditions are (9e) = 0, j = (1,6).
As before, the7th country's excess retum rj, is written in terms of the benchmark model and regressed on a constant aj, an indicator variable /JH for Thailand with (poj as its shift parameter, and the excess retums on the world portfolio rwi. The time-varying intercept aj',|Z^^,_, and beta in each country Pj,\z!^^,_i depends on a constant and an investor's sentiment index of the Thai baht devaluation /?(/TH(|ZJ!^,_I)-The sentiment index is linked through a logistic relation to local leverage indicators for Thailand Zjf,,_, and global market conditions Zf_^. The first set of moment conditions are normal regression equations, but the second set of orthogonality conditions are the first-order conditions from maximizing the likelihood of a logit model. It is straightforward to estimate this mixed equation system simultaneously.'^'* The extent to which the investor index model captures the shift in beta when the crisis started depends on how well the predicted crisis probability fits the actual crisis indicator. In Table 6 , we examine logit models for each country separately using their own devaluation dates. The dependent variable is the indicator variable for each country devaluation date that is equal to zero before devaluation and one after devaluation. The independent variables are the local leverage ratios and the world market conditions all lagged one week. ^L ogit results show the investor sentiment index fits the devaluation indicators quite well and that local leverage information, specifically the P/E and P/B ratios, contributes the bulk of the explanatory power. Local leverage indicatorŝ
•^Simultaneous estimation of multiple Probits by GMM can be found in Bertschek and Lechner (1998), Maddala (1983) discusses Logit models and mixed estimation using Likelihood methods. The comparison of GMM and Logit routines confirms that estimates are identical and standard errors are nearly identical,^T he variables P/B-EM and P/B-EM are excluded from the estimation due to convergence problems. 0.832 Table 6 shows ooefficients, p-values (in parentheses), and pseudo fl^s from logistio models using looal leverage and global market conditions. The dependent variable is each country's devaluation date where the indiotor is zero before devaiuation and one after devaiuation. Table 1 reports devaiuation dates and Table 4 describes independent variabies, iagged one week.
have strong predictive power in discriminating pre-and post-devaluation periods with the majority having high R^s. Surprisingly, exchange rates contributed the least to distinguishing the two periods. Global market conditions have a minor contribution.
With the P-IAPM, we seek to capture the changes in risk and retum at the start of the crisis in Thailand where indicator values /JH are very closely related (R^ = 83%) to the predicted index of investor sentiment. One expects the index for investor sentiment can substitute for the crisis indicator and therefore explain the changes in risk and retum at the start of the crisis. We formally test whether the crisis indicator and the investor sentiment index are substitutes in an asset pricing framework by estimating the P-IAPM equations (9) and bootstrapping their critical values.
There are several reasons for bootstrapping critical values. In the mixed model that we estimate, the sampling distributions of test statistics have wellbehaved large sample properties. However, it may take a very large sample to discriminate between the P-IAPM and the benchmark model nested in equations (9) because they are such close substitutes due to the high R^ found earlier. Also, the small sample distribution of test statistics where the indicator variable is endogenous and appears in other equations is not known. The distributions of test statistics are derived by performing fixed in repeated samples bootstrap (i.e., drawing errors only) with 3000 replications under each hypothesis. The indicator variable IjH, is the only dependent variable that appears on the right-hand side. This vari-able is constructed by adding the newly drawn error to the original predicted probability index, assigned a one if the result is greater than or equal to 0,5 and zero otherwise. Drawing their errors and adding back their predicted values as modified by the new indicator variable and the restrictions imposed by each hypothesis form the retums. After each set of replications, test values for each hypothesis are ranked to determine critical values.^T able 7 reports values of Wald, 7-statistics, and LR^^ tests and corresponding large sample and bootstrap critical values of the six hypotheses reported before and an additional three hypotheses specific to the P-IAPM. Although the results are mixed if conventional p-values are used, bootstrap confidence intervals are much wider and do not reject that the benchmark and P-IAPM models serve as substitutes. The values from bootstrapped distributions are large. There are very few rejections. This may reflect that when two models are close substitutes their critical values become very sensitive to sample size. The Wald statistic appears the most sensitive to sample size. Stars indicate the rejections we found in our sample using bootstrapped values for each confidence level. None of the Wald and 7-statistic tests reject at the 95% level and very few of the LR tests reject at the 95% level.
The index for investor sentiment explains the changes in risk and retum we see at the start of the crisis. We do not reject that the shift parameter coefficients are zero (i.e., H4: (pQ = (p^ = 0).^^ As expected, the close relationship between the crisis indicator and the predicted index of investor sentiment makes these two models statistical substitutes. Figure 1 presents a comparison of betas from Thailand based on the P-IAPM, TV-IAPM, the constant beta model, and the benchmark model with structural shifts around the time of the crisis. The P-IAPM roughly follows the shift in beta depicted in the benchmark model. Not only does the P-IAPM track the shift in beta after the crisis, but it also predicts an increase in beta in the months leading up to the crisis date; the TV-IAPM does not. Based on predictions of the P-IAPM alone it would be difficult to conclude that the investor's sentiment "predicts" the increase in beta before the crisis began. Crises, by their nature, are infrequent events and all estimation takes place in sample. However, news of speculation as early as February, the Thai bhat intervention in May 1997, and mounting bad loans in the Thailand real estate sector support these predictions. This evidence indicates that investors' reassessment of risk and retum preceded the official start of the crisis. Table 8 presents evidence of leverage effects in a cross-section of 589 firms from our six sample countries obtained from the FMDB. Pre-and post-crisis beto Efron (1979) and Nelson and Kim (1993) for a discussion of resampling methods. Fair (2002) adapts a bootstrapping method similar to ours for large non-linear macro models,^E ven though the errors may not be normally distributed, the maximum likelihood estimate of the covariance matrix is consistent and asymptotically normal. See Hayashi (2000) for computation and discussion,^S ymmetrically, the benchmark model can substitute equally well for the P-IAPM (i,e,, Hg: A] = ai = 0, in the presence of non-zero benchmark model parameters tj>o and (f>t). Tabie 7 presents p-values from Waid, J-stat, and LR tests of the P-iAPM (equations (9)). Refer to Tabies 1 and 3 for descriptions of variabies. Sample covers 10/05/90 tc 06/05/98. The nine hypotheses are tested on the constant ao, the coefficients 0o, and 0i that alicw for a structurai breai< in the P-iAPM at the time cf crisis, and the investor sentiment parameters X^ and a^. Degrees of freedom is denoted by df. The ieft-hand ooiumns of the tabie report the actual vaiues of Waid, J-stat, and LR tests of eaoh hypothesis and their iarge sample p-vaiues. The right coiumns contain bootstrapped criticai vaiues cf test statistics for conventionai confidence ieveis.
D. Cross-Sectional Evidence
"indicates rejection.
tas, pre-and post-crisis averages of returns, and the valuation ratios of each firm are used as data and grouped by market value quintile. Panel A shows the sample average for each quintile in the pre-crisis sample and the average difference between pre-and post-crisis samples (denoted by A). ^^ Consistent with time-series evidence, average retums drop, beta increases, and P/B and P/E ratios fall across quintiles after the start of the crisis. Panel B of Table 8 reports coefficients and their significance levels by quintile from regression models involving the firm-level change in average excess U.S. dollar retum from pre-to post-crisis samples against the change in beta and average P/B and P/E ratios from pre-to post-crisis samples. We also scale the extreme P/B and P/E ratios found in firm-level emerging market data by taking natural with non-positive average P/B ratios pre-or post-crisis are filtered out to remove extreme values, reducing the sample to 568 firms, Quintiles are formed on pre-crisis average market value. Results in panels A and B are insensitive to whether pre-crisis or overall sample average market values are used to create quintiles. Model I attempts to explain the cross-sectional differences in pre-and post-crisis average retum with changes in pre-to post-crisis beta. Models II and III assess the effects of adding the change in P/B and P/E ratios. Overall, evidence indicates the change in P/B is consistently significant and has the right sign. This confirms what is found in the time series where a fall in the P/B ratio is associated with lower average retums. As Model II shows, the change in P/B is significant in all but the smallest quintile. The change in beta is only significant in the smallest quintile with the right sign; as beta rises average retums fall. Adding the P/E ratio in Model III restricts the sample and shows only a marginal effect in the largest quintile with the right sign.
VI. Conclusion
This paper investigates changes in risk and retum in six Asian markets before and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis began. Using a six-country sample of weekly equity market retums from October 1990 to June 1998, we find that while betas increased more than fivefold after the crisis began, average retums fell more than sevenfold. We address an interesting puzzle where risk has increased and average retums fall. When beta increases, capital losses must be suffered to make higher expected returns possible. These capital losses are part of observed retums.
Leverage is a key feature of financial crisis models. Prior to a crisis, firms are highly levered with short-term, mostly unhedged, dollar denominated debt. Once '"it is common practice to consider only positive values of valuation ratios. As such, Models I-III contain 589, 568, and 474 firms overall. Panel A presents sampie averages for U.S. doiiar returns, CAPM betas (/3), and P/B and P/E ratios before the start of the orisis and changes in sampie averages from pre-to post-crisis (denoted by A) by size quintiie. Quintiies are determined by average market value prior to crisis. There are 568 of 589 firms in this sampie that have positive average P/B ratios. Data cf individual firms are v^eekiy from sampie period defined in Tabie 1. Panei B oontains regression ooeffioients and p-values (in parentheses) using White corrected standard errors by quintile of the average change in excess return of each firm from pre-to pcst-crisis {Ar) on changes in average beta {A0 in modei i, and then adding the ohange in iog of the average P/B ratios, A in(P/B), and P/E ratios, A in(P/E), in modeis ii and III, respectiveiy Modeis i-lll contain 589, 568, and 474 firms overail.
monetary authorities devalue, leverage and interest payments increase. Familiar valuation ratios can be used to reveal information about the effect of leverage on discount rates, as leverage is difficult to measure directly. The increased leverage contributes to the rise in equity betas and raises expected retums. Valuation ratios decline as prices reflect the rise in discount rates. Capital losses are necessarily created to make higher expected retums possible. Information from news reports suggests that investors do anticipate changes in risk and retum before the crisis officially starts and update these expectations in the post-crisis period. Statistical break point tests find significant breaks five or more months after the crisis officially started-at the peak of the crisis.
Our model predicts an increase in beta months before the crisis officially started. Tests indicate this model, which uses portfolios managed by an index of investor sentiment, can explain the large shifts in beta and average retum after the crisis started. Familiar valuation ratios tell the story that when leverage increases, beta will increase and average retum falls because capital losses are necessary for higher expected retums. We provide evidence consistent with the predictions of financial crisis models where leverage plays a key role. In addition, we show that changes in leverage indicators can explain cross-sectional differences in average retums.
